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CASENOTE
BRECHT V. ABRAHAMSON: ANOTHER STEP TOWARD
EVISCERATION OF HABEAS CORPUS*
As the amount of crime in this country increases, society is becoming
more conscious of our criminal justice system. People are increasingly
concerned with the outcome of criminal trials, specifically in assuring that
crimes do not go unpunished. Determining guilt, ensuring that verdicts
are not overruled on a "technicality," and issuing punishment have taken
precedence over the protection of constitutional rights.' However, the
Constitution is not only concerned with the outcome of criminal trials. It
is just as surely concerned with individual rights and process. 2
Outcome-orientation appears to be the current trend among members
of the Supreme Court as well. Although veiled in the language of "feder-
alism" and "finality," the Court has slowly been eviscerating the writ of
habeas corpus, particularly by weakening the harmless error standard to
be applied on a habeas corpus petition.3 The Court maintains that it
must lighten the load of the federal judiciary, and although that sounds
appealing, that is not what is actually happening.4 Instead, constitutional
* The author gratefully acknowledges the insight provided by Michael A. Moynihan who
argued and briefed the Brecht case before the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals and also
prepared the petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court.
1. Irene M. Rosenberg & Yale L. Rosenberg, Guilt: Henry Friendly Meets the MaHaRal
of Prague, 90 MICH. L. REV. 604, 605 (1991) ("[T]he issue of factual guilt now pervades
American criminal constitutional law, often in ways that do not rest comfortably along-side
the Bill of Rights' guarantees limiting government power in the criminal justice process.").
2. Tom Stacy & Kim Dayton, Rethinking Harmless Constitutional Error, 88 COLUM. L.
REv. 79, 90 (1988).
3. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 503 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Today's holding
portends substantial evisceration of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction . . . ."); Jeffrey J.
Pokorak, "Death Stands Condemned:" Justice Brennan and the Death Penalty, 27 CAL. W.
L. REv. 239, 256 (1990/1991) ("The gradual elimination of federal habeas corpus has had
obvious impact on all individuals convicted of a crime in a state court."); Yale L. Rosenberg,
Kaddish for Federal Habeas Corpus, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 362, 362-63 (1991) ("[t]he
Rehnquist Court has quietly eviscerated, if not interred, federal habeas corpus...").
4. Commentators have argued that the impact habeas corpus petitions have upon the fed-
eral judiciary is overstated. See, e.g., David D. Kammer, Restricting New-Claim Successive
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rights are being violated and the window of opportunity for individuals to
question those violations or to have their convictions overturned is closing
rapidly.'
The opportunity for a prisoner to have the violation of his constitu-
tional rights reviewed and reversed has recently been diminished by the
Supreme Court in Brecht v. Abrahamson.' The Court upheld the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals which had, by using the standard created in
Kotteakos v. United States,7 created a new standard of harmlessness for
collateral review of constitutional errors.' This new standard considers
whether the error had "substantial and injurious effect or influence in
determining the jury's verdict,"' as opposed to the "harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt" standard that had been in effect."0 This new standard
further erodes harmless error review, making it more difficult for a peti-
tion of habeas corpus to be granted based upon a constitutional error.
In Part I this article provides background history and current Supreme
Court trends in harmless error and habeas corpus jurisprudence. Part II
presents a factual analysis of the Brecht case. Part III includes a history
of collateral review and the recent trends in the Court's analyses. An in-
depth discussion of the Seventh Circuit's decision in Brecht v. Abraham-
son is presented in Part IV, while Part V presents the Supreme Court's
ruling and justification. The conclusion in Part VI suggests that the Court
is determined to "fix" the problem of habeas corpus, however affirming
the Seventh Circuit's decision is not the solution.
I. HISTORY OF HARMLESS CONSTITUTIONAL ERROR
Harmless constitutional error originated in mid-nineteenth century
England. 1 English courts adopted a procedure for evaluating error in
criminal cases which required reversal if a reasonable possibility existed
that the error contributed to the finding of guilt." This presumption of
Applications for Federal Writs of Habeas Corpus: McCleskey v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. 1454
(1991), 60 U. CIN. L. Rav. 1405, 1423 (1992).
5. See Ronald J. Tabak & J. Mark Lane, Judicial Activism and Legislative "Reform" of
Federal Habeas Corpus: A Critical Analysis of Recent Developments and Current Propos-
als, 55 ALB. L. REV. 1, 94 (1991) ("Under these [recent Supreme Court] decisions, numerous
people have been executed despite having been convicted or sentenced in prejudicial viola-
tion of the Constitution.").
6. 113 S. Ct. 1710 (1993).
7. 328 U.S. 750 (1946).
8. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 944 F.2d 1363 (7th Cir. 1991), aff'd, 113 S. Ct. 1710 (1993).
9. Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 776.
10. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).
11. ROGER J. TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF HARMLESS ERROR 4, 7-8 (1970).
12. Id. at 1-11. See generally Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Comment: Arizona v. Fulminante:
The Harm of Applying Harmless Error to Coerced Confessions, 105 HARV. L. REV. 152, 156
(1991).
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prejudice, also called the Exchequer Rule,13 caused a backlog in the
courts since many cases were retried on extremely technical errors.'4 In
response to the overcrowded English courts, Parliament enacted legisla-
tion that prohibited reversal in cases unless "some substantial wrong or
miscarriage ha[d] been thereby occasioned on the trial."15
American courts adopted the Exchequer Rule and soon had the same
difficulties as the English courts.'" American courts took longer to remedy
the problem, but in 1919 Congress established a harmless error rule which
is now embodied in Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure. 17 Most federal and state courts only applied the harmless error
rules to ordinary trial errors, and not to errors that violated the Constitu-
tion.' s Those federal courts that did review constitutional errors generally
presumed them to be harmful per se, requiring automatic reversal. 9 It
was not until the 1960's that the United States Supreme Court guided
state courts on how to apply harmless error analysis to federal constitu-
tional errors.20 In Fahy v. Connecticut,2 the Court considered whether a
state court's application of the harmless error rule to illegally seized evi-
dence was proper.2" The Court applied harmless error analysis to the par-
ticular facts in Fahy; however, it did not address the question of whether
13. Most commentators trace the Exchequer Rule to the case of Crease v. Barrett, 149
Eng. Rep. 1353 (Ex. 1835). See TRAYNOR, supra note 11, at 1-11; Steven H. Goldberg, Harm-
less Error: Constitutional Sneak Thief, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 421, 422 (1980). See
generally J.L. Renfro, Arizona v. Fulminante: Extending Harmless-Error Analysis to the
Erroneous Admission of Coerced Confessions, 66 TuL. L. REV. 581, 582 (1991).
14. TRAYNOR, supra note 11, at 1-11.
15. TRAYNOR, supra note 11, at 9 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Judicature Act, 1873, 36 &
37 Vict., ch. 66, sched. 48 (Eng.)).
16. 1 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 21 (Tillers rev. 1983).
17. Act of February 26, 1919, ch. 48, 40 Stat. 1181. The current version is codified in 28
U.S.C. § 2111 (1993) which states: "[O]n the hearing of any appeal or writ of certiorari in
any case, the court shall give judgment after an examination of the record without regard to
errors or defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties." Id. § 2111.
18. Philip J. Mause, Harmless Constitutional Error: The Implications of Chapman v.
California, 53 MINN. L. REV. 519, 520 (1969). Constitutional errors were considered to be of
such great importance that a finding of harmless error was improper. Id. Most courts re-
versed convictions based on constitutional error without even a discussion of harmless error.
Id. See, e.g., Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213,,222-23 (1967) (holding defendant's
denial of a speedy trial was error); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369-70 (1931)
(holding a conviction based on an unconstitutional statute required automatic reversal). But
see Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458 (1900) (holding defendant who confessed in court
was not entitled to automatic reversal of his conviction despite the erroneous admission of
evidence which violated the Sixth Amendment).
19. See, e.g., Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764-65 (1946); Jackson v. United
States, 264 F.2d 377 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 936 (1959). But see Motes, 178 U.S.
at 475-76.
20. Mause, supra note 18, at 520.
21. 375 U.S. 85 (1963).
22. Id. at 86.
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harmless error statutes covered every constitutional error.2 3 It merely
found that the error in Fahy was harmful.2 4
In the 1967 decision Chapman v. California5 the Supreme Court fi-
nally spoke definitively about harmless constitutional error and squarely
rejected the idea that all constitutional errors require overturning the
conviction. In Chapman, although noting that "some constitutional rights
[are] so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be treated as
harmless error,"2 6 the Court held that "there may be some constitutional
errors which in the setting of a particular case are so unimportant and
insignificant that they may, consistent with the Federal Constitution, be
deemed harmless, not requiring the automatic reversal of the convic-
tion."2 Placing the burden of persuasion on the prosecution, the Court
stated that "before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless,
the [reviewing] court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt."2 The Court proceeded to apply this harm-
less error rule to the constitutional error before it, which involved the
prosecutor's repeated comments concerning the defendant's failure to tes-
tify.2" The Court concluded that the prosecutor's improper comments
were harmful.
3 0
The Court in Chapman adopted a precise standard for applying harm-
less error. The government is required to establish that the error is harm-
less "beyond a reasonable doubt" before a constitutional violation will be
subject to harmless error.31 The application of this strict rule which was
developed in Fahy and affirmed in Chapman, essentially required auto-
matic reversal in all circumstances.
32
The Supreme Court then moved toward a less stringent application of
harmless constitutional error analysis in Harrington v. California.3 3 Har-
23. Charles F. Campbell, Jr., An Economic View of Developments in the Harmless Error
and Exclusionary Rules, 42 BAYLOR L. REV. 499, 506-07 (1990).
24. Id. The Fahy Court ruled that when a reviewing court finds a constitutional error to
be harmless, there must be no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the peti-
tioner's conviction. Id.
25. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
26. Id. at 23. The Court cited three examples of constitutional rights that required auto-
matic reversal: the right to counsel, freedom from coerced confessions, and the right to an
impartial judge. Id. & n.8 (citations omitted).
27. Id. at 22.
28. Id. at 24.
29. Id. at 24-26.
30. Id. at 26.
31. Id. at 24.
32. TRAYNOR, supra note 11, at 43. The Court appeared reluctant to affirm a decision
where the trial court committed a constitutional error. Id.
33. 395 U.S. 250, 253-54 (1969). See generally Stephen L. Earnest, Recent Decision, Ad-
mission of Coerced Confession Constitutional Error Subject to Harmless Error Analysis, 61
Miss. L.J. 445, 446 (1991); Campbell, supra note 23 at 506-07. Violations of the Sixth
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rington and three others were jointly tried and convicted of attempted
robbery and first-degree murder. Harrington's three co-defendants con-
fessed to the crime and the prosecution introduced their confessions at
trial.34 Two of the three who confessed did not testify at trial. Therefore,
Harrington was not able to cross-examine them, and was denied his Sixth
Amendment right to confrontation .3 The Court agreed that Harrington's
constitutional rights were violated but applied harmless error analysis,
concluding that the error was harmless because statements made by Har-
rington, combined with other evidence, overwhelmingly supported the
conviction.36 Specifically, the evidence was "so overwhelming" that the
admission of the co-defendant's confession was harmless beyond a reason-
able doubt.3 7 This application of harmless error analysis suggested the
Supreme Court's willingness to apply harmless error in most constitu-
tional error cases s. 3 However, no identifiable test for assessing the harm-
lessness of constitutional error had yet been established.3 9
The Supreme Court further modified the overwhelming evidence test of
Harrington in Milton v. Wainwright." In Milton a police officer posed as
the defendant's cellmate and the defendant eventually confessed the
crime to him. 41 The police officer then testified against the defendant at
trial.4 2 The defendant argued that the use of this confession violated his
Fifth Amendment right against self incrimination and his Sixth Amend-
ment right to have counsel present during post-arrest questioning.43 The
Supreme Court declined to decide whether the police officer's testimony
violated Milton's Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. Instead, the Court
held that "[a]ssuming, arguendo, that the challenged testimony should
Amendment right to confrontation clause had been addressed by the Supreme Court one
year earlier in Bruton v. United States. 391 U.S. 123 (1968) (one codefendant's confession
used to implicate another codefendant). However, the Court reversed Bruton's conviction
based on constitutional error without applying harmless error analysis. Id. at 137. The Court
stated that such an error required automatic reversal every time, even though Chapman v.
California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), had been decided one year previously.
34. Harrington, 395 U.S. at 252. The Court stated that the other two confessions would
merely provide cumulative evidence. Id. at 254.
35. Id. at 254-55.
36. Id. at 254.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 252; see also Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 227, 232 (1977) (violating defend-
ant's Sixth Amendment rights was subject to harmless error analysis); Brown v. United
States, 411 U.S. 223, 231-32 (1973) (improperly admitting testimony of another was harm-
less); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 11 (1970) (denying counsel, which violated the Sixth
Amendment, was subject to harmless error analysis).
39. See generally Campbell, supra note 23, at 506; Goldberg, supra note 13; Stacy &
Dayton, supra note 2.
40. 407 U.S. 371 (1972).
41. Id. at 372.
42. Id.
43. Id.
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have been excluded, the record clearly reveals that any error in its admis-
sion was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."'4" The Court agreed that
the confession should not have been admitted; however, it concluded that
other evidence, excluding the confession, justified the conviction.45 The
Court seemed to adopt the view that the erroneous admission of even
incriminating evidence may be harmless if the Court is satisfied that
there is overwhelming evidence of guilt to support a conviction. 46 Thus, it
appears that regardless of how prejudicial a constitutional error might be,
if a case against a defendant was so strong that a conviction was inevita-
ble, the conviction should not- be reversed.47
Over the ten-year aftermath of its decisions in Chapman, Harrington,
and Milton, the Supreme Court expanded the power of the courts to find
harmless constitutional error.48 In 1983, the Court clarified its approach
regarding the specific rights to which Chapman applies.49 Three years
later, the Court reiterated its position by stating "while there are some
errors to which Chapman does not apply, they are the exception and not
the rule." 50 In Rose v. Clark, the Court declared that the Chapman rule is
presumptively appropriate for virtually every kind of constitutional er-
ror." As a result, constitutional error generally does not necessitate apto-
matic reversal of a criminal conviction. A conviction will be upheld if an
appellate court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that the error had
no impact on the ultimate finding of guilt.5'
44. Id.
45. Id. at 373-77. The petitioner had confessed to the crime three other times before the
police charged him. Thus, the Court ruled that the three confessions were overwhelmingly
supportive of the conviction and the confession to the police officer in his cell was harmless.
Id. at 377-78.
46. Campbell, supra note 23, at 506-07; see also Earnest, supra note 33, at 447.
47. Campbell, supra note 23, at 507.
48. Commentators have sharply criticized the Court's gradual expansion of the harmless
error doctrine. Stacy & Dayton, supra note 2; see Goldberg, supra note 13 at 427; Mause,
supra note 18, at 557.
49. United States v. Hastings, 461 U.S. 499 (1983). The Court stated that "it is the duty
of a reviewing court to consider the trial record as a whole and to ignore errors that are
harmless, including most constitutional violations." Id. at 509 (citations omitted).
50. Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 578-79 (1986) (citation omitted) (applying harmless error
analysis to an erroneous malice instruction).
51. Id. at 576. In Rose, the Court held that if a defendant was represented by counsel and
was tried before an impartial adjudicator, any errors are strongly presumed to be subject to
harmless error analysis. Id. at 577-79. The Court appealed to the truth-determining function
of a criminal trial, declaring that " 'the central purpose of a criminal trial is to decide the
factual question of defendant's guilt or innocence.'" Id. at 577 (quoting United States v.
Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 230 (1975)). Unless the errors affect the reliability of the fact-finding
process, harmless error analysis should apply. See Stacy & Dayton, supra note 2, at 85-87.
52. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).
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The Supreme Court made a second significant decision in 1986 in Dela-
ware v. Van Arsdall. 3 The trial court had prohibited any questions relat-
ing to the possibility that the state's witness was biased. The Supreme
Court, applying Chapman's harmless error rule, held that the central
theme of the trial was to determine factual questions of the defendant's
guilt or innocence, with the focus upon the overall fairness of the trial
and not on the presence of immaterial error.5 4 The Court also affirmed
that the denial of counsel and the presence of a non-impartial judge al-
ways required automatic reversal regardless of the facts of the case. Un-
like Chapman, however, coerced confessions were not deemed to mandate
strict automatic reversal.5 The Van Arsdall Court indicated that coerced
confessions could be harmless depending on the specific facts of the
case.
56
In 1991, the Supreme Court directly addressed whether confessions ob-
tained in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment were subject to harm-
less error analysis.5 7 In Arizona v. Fulminante, the prosecution obtained
a conviction based upon the coerced confession of the defendant.58 The
Supreme Court held that an appellate court must apply harmless error
analysis and uphold the conviction if the court deems the confession to be
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.5 9 In determining that harmless error
analysis should be applied, the Court divided errors into two types: trial
errors and structural defects. Trial errors were defined as errors in the
trial process occurring in the presentation of the case which could be
quantitively assessed.6 0 The Court listed examples of trial errors such as
excluding members of the defendant's race from a grand jury or violating
the defendant's right to self-representation.6 1 Structural defects are errors
53. 475 U.S. 673 (1986) (applying harmless error analysis to a violation of the Confronta-
tion Clause).
54. Id. at 681. The Court stated that certain constitutional errors could be harmless in
"terms of their effect on the fact finding process at trial." Id.
55. Id. at 682.
56. Id. at 684.
57. Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991). The dissent argued that the majority's
decision deviated from clear precedent. Id. at 1253 (White, J., dissenting). In support of the
dissents proposition, Justice White listed the unbroken line of precedent before and after
Chapman that expressly exempted coerced confessions from harmless error analysis. Id.
58. While Fulminante was incarcerated on weapons charges a rumor had been spread that
Fulminante had killed his eleven-year old stepdaughter in Arizona. Therefore, Fulminante
was befriended by an FBI informant who promised Fulminante protection while he was in
prison if he would tell the informant whether the rumor was true. Consequently, Fulni-
nante confessed that he had sexually assaulted and killed his stepdaughter. He had previ-
ously been a suspect in the case because of inconsistencies in his statements; however, the
police did not have enough evidence to charge him with the crime. Fulminante was subse-
quently indicted on murder charges in Arizona. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. at 1250.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1264.
61. Id. at 1265.
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that affect the framework or the conduct of the trial, such as denying the
defendant counsel or trying a case before a biased judge . 2 Harmless error
analysis only applies to trial errors, while structural defects remain sub-
ject to automatic reversal.13 This test in Fulminante expands the poten-
tial application of harmless error analysis, possibly marking the beginning
of a new era in constitutional criminal procedure in which the rights of
criminal defendants are further constricted. 4 Even though the Arizona
police lacked sufficient evidence to charge Fulminante at the time of the
murder, four Justices would have held that the admission of Fulminante's
confession to the informant was harmless error.6 5 Thus, the amount of
untainted evidence necessary to support finding harmless error may in
fact be minimal.
II. Brecht v. Abrahamson: THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT DECISION
Todd Brecht had been serving time in Georgia for felony theft when his
sister and brother-in-law, Molly and Roger Hartman, paid restitution and
took temporary custody of him while he waited for an opening in a half-
way house. 6 The Hartman's placed two restrictions on Brecht. He was
not permitted to drink alcohol or engage in homosexual activities while he
was living in their home.6 7 On October 17, 1985, Brecht was at home
alone and decided to consume alcohol and shoot some cans in the back
yard. When Roger Hartman returned home, Brecht shot him and fled the
scene. Hartman was able to crawl to a neighbor's house and inform them
that Brecht had shot him.' In the meantime, Brecht drove away and
later ran his car into a ditch. When a police officer stopped to help,
Brecht told the officer that his sister was calling a tow truck.69 Brecht
then hitched a ride to Minnesota and was later picked up and arrested at
a shopping center. He first lied about his identity and then asked to talk
with "somebody that would understand" him.70 Brecht made no further
statements about the shooting until the day of his trial. At trial, Brecht
admitted shooting Hartman but said that the rifle discharged by acci-
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1264-65.
64. R.W. Rachal, Recent Development, State v. Cage: Harmless Error Analysis in Louisi-
ana After Fulminante, 66 TUL. L. REV. 1086, 1095 (1992).
65. Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Souter found that it was harmless error to
admit Fulminante's testimony.
66. Brecht's brother-in-law was the District Attorney for Buffalo County, Wisconsin at
the time. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 944 F.2d 1363, 1364 (7th Cir. 1991) aff'd, 113 S. Ct. 1710
(1993).
67. Brecht was a self-admitted alcoholic and the Hartmans were recovering alcoholics.
Brecht had also admitted to his sister that he had homosexual tendencies. Id. at 1364.
68. Roger Hartman eventually died from his wounds on November 11, 1985. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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dent.7 1 The prosecution pointed to four instances of Brecht's silence and
attempted to use that to impeach him.72 On March 14, 1986, the jury
found Brecht guilty of first-degree murder by use of a dangerous weapon.
A succession of appeals followed, and the Seventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals eventually heard the case.73 This court was the fourth court in se-
quence to disagree with its immediate predecessor.74 It is important to
consider in some detail the rationale behind the Seventh Circuit's deci-'
sion in order to better understand the United States Supreme Court's
final ruling.
The Seventh Circuit first disagreed with the district court's overall
analysis.75 The court essentially dismissed the evidentiary question and
71. According to Brecht, Roger's return caught him by surprise. Brecht did not want
Roger to see him with the gun so he ran to replace it upstairs. While running, he tripped
and the rifle accidentally discharged. Brecht stated that he tried to find Roger to help him,
but he disappeared. When he saw Roger at the neighbor's door, Brecht panicked and drove
away.' Id.
72. The trial court pointed to two instances where the prosecutor asked Brecht whether
he told anyone at any time before trial that the shooting was accidental. He also remarked
twice in closing argument that Brecht told no one of the incident. The court thought these
four references invited the jury to draw an adverse inference from post-arraignment silence.
References to post-arraignment silence were found to violate the rule set forth in Doyle v.
Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976) (holding post-arrest silence may not be used to impeach a defend-
ant). Id. at 1465.
73. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed Brecht's conviction, holding that
prosecutorial references to Brecht's pre-trial silence violated his right to a fair trial. The
court also held this prejudicial error to be magnified by erroneous evidentiary rulings made
at the trial level. State v. Brecht, 405 N.W.2d 718 (1987). The Wisconsin Supreme Court
reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstated Brecht's conviction. While
finding error in the state's reference to Brecht's post-arrest silence, the supreme court held
such error to be harmless. Similarly, the court concluded that any erroneous evidentiary
rulings made by the trial court were harmless. State v. Brecht, 421 N.W.2d 96 (1988).
On August 24, 1990, Brecht filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus with the United
States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin. In its Opinion and Order of
March 14, 1991, the district court granted the petition for habeas relief. 759 F. Supp. 500
(W.D. Wis. 1991). The court held that the state's references at trial to Brecht's post-arrest
silence impermissibly infringed on his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the
Constitution. Id. The trial court's error in allowing such references to be made was not
harmless. The district court further held that the admission of evidence as to Brecht's ho-
mosexuality as well as a trial court ruling that Brecht could not offer testimonial evidence as
to his non-violent character without exposing himself to cross-examination regarding a past
conviction were both constitutional errors and not harmless in nature. Id.
74. In referring to the district court's issuance of the writ of habeas corpus, Judge Easter-
brook of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals stated the court "continued this game of
Ping-Pong." Brecht, 944 F.2d at 1366.
75. Id. at 1367. The court stated that the district judge substituted her assessment for
that of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin and that it is "not an appropriate stance for a
federal judge engaged in collateral review of a state conviction." Id.
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the homosexuality issue, instead focusing on Brecht's silence."6 The
court's first step was to determine that the prosecution's references to
Brecht's silence before arraignment were proper. However, the questions
and remarks made during the prosecutor's closing argument concerning
whether Brecht told his story "at any time" before trial were condemned
by Doyle v. Ohio.7 7 In Doyle, the Supreme Court held that a prosecutor
may not undermine the implications of the Miranda warnings. A suspect
told that he has a right to remain silent may not be "bushwacked by an
argument that silence implies guilt. '7 8 Once concluding that the refer-
ences to Brecht's post-arrest silence constituted error, the court then con-
sidered whether the error was harmless.
The Seventh Circuit stated that the issue of whether the error was
harmless depended on whether the entitlement Doyle established imple-
ments a part of the Bill of Rights or is a constitutional prophylaxis. 9 The
court explained that the rule of Doyle reduces the chance that Miranda
warnings will injure the persons they are supposed to protect. Having im-
plied when giving warnings that silence is safe, the government may not
change its tune at trial.80 However, the warnings themselves are not a
part of the Constitution. They are designed to inform suspects of their
entitlements and so reduce the likelihood of subtle coercion while in cus-
tody.81 The court determined that Doyle is a "prophylactic rule designed
to protect another prophylactic rule from erosion or misuse. It has noth-
ing to do with the defendant's guilt and everything to do with insisting
that the government play straight with those it prosecutes."8 2
Next, instead of considering whether the violation of Doyle was "harm-
less beyond a reasonable doubt, 8 3 the court moved on to what it termed
the "antecedent" question. 4 This question is whether a federal court
should apply the "reasonable doubt" standard derived from Chapman on
collateral review of Doyle violations.8 5 The Seventh Circuit had previ-
ously considered the question to be "open" in Hunter v. Clark.s6 Al-
76. See id. at 1367-68 for a complete discussion on the evidentiary issues. Since the
United States Supreme Court did not grant certiorari on these issues, they are beyond the
scope of this paper.
77. 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
78. Brecht, 944 F.2d at 1368.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1370.
81. Id. (citations omitted).
82. Id.
83. This is the standard promulgated in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
84. The court stated that the question is one about which reasonable persons could and
had disagreed, referring to the judges and justices who reached different conclusions as the
Brecht case moved from court to court. Id. at 1370.
85. Id.
86. 934 F.2d 856 (7th Cir. 1991) (en banc). See also Hanrahan v. Greer, 896 F.2d 241, 244-
45 (7th Cir. 1990) (calling the question open but avoiding resolution because the argument
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though two judges concluded that the reasonable doubt standard should
not be employed'in the collateral enforcement of prophylactic rules,1
7
four other judges called the concurring opinion "persuasive." They re-
marked that the opinion "may well be correct," however found it unnec-
essary to issue a final decision.88 Thus, the issue has never been fully
addressed.
The Supreme Court has never addressed the collateral review issue.s9
There are, however, several cases which have considered collateral review
generally. In Stone v. Powell," the Court explained that federal courts
are not required on collateral review to employ the same standards which
state courts must use for reviewing every constitutional claim.9 1 Stone, in
its most direct ruling, held that when a defendant invokes the exclusion-
ary rule devised to implement the Fourth Amendment, the only inquiry
made by a federal court should be whether the state gave the defendant a
full and fair opportunity to litigate the claim.2 Errors in application
would no longer be cognizable in federal habeas corpus proceedings.
9 3
Further, Stone disregarded the argument that state courts could not be
trusted."4 In essence, the Court provided that on collateral review federal
courts need not replicate the efforts of the judges of the state tribunals; it
is enough to ensure that states adjudicate these claims.95
The Brecht court, considering the Stone collateral review standard too
strict, proffered a more deferential alternative. 8 This alternative would
serve as a middle ground between federal review that duplicates the di-
rect appeal and federal review that is, after the fashion of Stone, next to
no review at all." The Brecht court looked to the history of collateral
had not been preserved in district court); Fencl v. Abrahamson, 841 F.2d 760, 766-67 n.6
(7th Cir. 1988) (recognizing the question but avoiding resolution).
87. Hunter, 934 F.2d at 865-66 (concurring opinion).
88. Id. at 859 n.1 (plurality opinion). The other five members of the court did not address
the question.
89. The Supreme Court did grant certiorari to identify the proper standard on collateral
attack in United States ex rel. Miller v. Greer, 789 F.2d 438 (7th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (using
the reasonable doubt test), however it did not reach the issue because it held there had been
no error in the first place. Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756 (1987). See also United States ex rel.
Savory v. Lane, 832 F.2d 1011, 1020 (7th Cir. 1987) (reiterating the approach in Miller).
90. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
91. 28 U.S.C § 2254 (1992) regulates federal petitions for writ of habeas corpus which
seek relief from a state court criminal judgment.
92. Stone, 428 U.S. at 493-94.
93. Id. at 494.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 494 n.35.
96. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 944 F.2d 1363, 1372 (7th Cir. 1991), aff'd, 113 S. Ct. 1710
(1993).
97. Id. This alternative, stated the court, would provide the federal court with substan-
tially greater power to ensure that the state court is taking seriously its obligation to enforce
the substantive rules. Id.
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review in order to find some instruction in how to address the proper
standard for collateral review.""
III. HISTORY OF COLLATERAL REVIEW
For the majority of this nation's history, "next to none" accurately de-
scribed collateral review of state judgments.99 The Judiciary Act of 1789
gave federal courts jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus to prison-
ers in federal custody.' The specific availability of federal habeas corpus
for state petitioners was not addressed until 1867. The Federal Habeas
Corpus Act of 1867 empowered the federal courts to issue writs of habeas
corpus only to release persons held without authority, or in other words,
without jurisdiction.10 1 If a tribunal had jurisdiction over the subject mat-
ter and the person, one could obtain no collateral relief, regardless of how
egregious the trial error.
0 2
From 1867 until the 1930's, federal habeas relief for state petitioners
was generally limited to cases in which the state statute defining the of-
fense or the punishment was unconstitutional or the conviction or sen-
tence was void for lack of jurisdiction.' 0 ' Although it was established that
federal habeas corpus relief could be granted when a state petitioner had
been denied a federally protected constitutional right, from the 1930's un-
til the early 1950's, various procedural obstacles to relief made the consid-
eration of habeas petitions on the merits rare. 04 However, in Brown v.
Allen,"'0 just prior to the Warren years, the Supreme Court sanctioned
98. Id. at 1372-73.
99. Id. at 1372.
100. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, 81-82 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1-1631
(1982)). Section 14 of the Judiciary Act provides in part: "[E]ither of the justices of the
supreme court, as well as judges of the district courts, shall have the power to grant writs of
habeas corpus for the purpose of an inquiry into the cause of commitment." Id. at 82.
101. Federal Habeas Corpus Act of 1867. ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385, 385 (current version codi-
fied at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-55 (1982)). Section 2254(a) provides:
The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall enter-
tain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursu-
ant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1982). See generally WILLIAM F. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF
HABEAS CORPUS, 189-94 (1980).
102. See Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State
Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. Rav. 441, 463-69 (1963).
103. See generally DONALD E. WILKES, JR, FEDERAL AND STATE POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES
AND RELIEF 23-24 (1983) (discussing Supreme Court decisions regarding the scope of the
writ).
104. See id. The Court's method of expanding review beyond strictly jurisdictional claims
was to consider the omission of procedures designed to protect the innocent as equivalent to
the lack of jurisdiction. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 944 F.2d 1363, 1372 (7th Cir. 1991), aff'd,
113 S. Ct. 1710 (1993).
105. 334 U.S. 443 (1953).
[Vol. 27:549
BRECHT V. ABRAHAMSON
the broad application of habeas corpus to state adjudications of federal
law.106 Brown held that the Supremacy Clause required a federal law
question raised in a state proceeding to receive federal review.107 Brown
later became a critical tool in the Warren Court's revolution in constitu-
tional criminal procedure. 08
The Warren Court enlarged the number of federal rights available for
state defendants, removed various procedural obstacles to habeas relief,
and expanded the scope of review of the federal courts. 09 This expansion
of the writ lasted until the early 1970's when the Burger Court began to
restrict the availability of federal habeas corpus relief. The Burger Court
narrowed the scope of federally protected rights and generally expanded
the number and reach of various obstacles to relief." 0 Specifically, in
Wainwright v. Sykes,"' the Court held that a state procedural default
would prevent federal review unless the defendant could show both exter-
nal cause and prejudice resulting from the state procedural default, or in
the alternative, demonstrate the necessity of review to prevent a funda-
mental miscarriage of justice.1'2 The defendant cannot merely show that
the error had an adverse effect. Rather, he or she must show that the
error could threaten the conviction of the innocent." 3 The Rehnquist
Court has continued this trend of establishing procedural barriers to the
federal habeas corpus remedy. This Court seems to be more concerned
with respecting state interests than protecting constitutional rights." 4
Recently, in Coleman v. Thompson, 1 5 the Court overruled Fay v. Noia,
a case that had been a milestone in collateral review expansion." 6 The
106. Id. at 459-60.
107. Id. at 459.
108. See Mark M. Arkin, Rethinking the Constitutional Right to a Criminal Appeal, 39
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 503, 530 (1992).
109. WiLKEs, supra note 103, at 23-24; cf. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963) (holding that a
procedural default in state court does not bar federal habeas corpus review unless the pris-
oner deliberately bypassed state procedures, intentionally foregoing an opportunity for state
review).
110. See generally WiLKEs, supra note 103, at 23-24.
111. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
112. Id. at 90-91. Wainwright specifically held that a state prisoner who failed to make a
timely objection under state rule to the admission of inculpatory statements could not liti-
gate that claim in a federal habeas corpus proceeding without showing cause for and actual
prejudice from the noncompliance. Id. at 78.
113. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 944 F.2d 1363, 1372 (7th Cir. 1991), afi'd, 113 S. Ct. 1710
(1993); see also Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal
Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 142 (1970).
114. See, e.g., Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 309-10 (1989) (plurality opinion) (holding
that the states' interest in finality prevents federal courts from applying new constitutional
rules retroactively in a habeas proceeding); Wainwright, supra notes 111-12 and accompa-
nying text.
115. 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2565 (1991).
116. 372 U.S. 391 (1963); see supra note 109.
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Coleman Court held that all cases involving a state prisoner who has for-
feited his federal claims pursuant to an independent and adequate state
procedural rule will be denied federal habeas review.117 However, the bar
does not apply to any claimant who demonstrates cause for the default
and proves that actual prejudice resulted from the abuse of federal law,
or demonstrates that a fundamental miscarriage of justice will result if
the federal court does not hear the claims. 118 Coleman also held that at-
torney error in state collateral proceedings is unlikely to cause a proce-
dural default.1 9 In reaching its holdings, the Court gave deference to
state procedures and a state's interest in finality. This is a new type of
federalism which essentially requires further contraction of the reach of
habeas review.120
The Supreme Court further restricted access to the writ of habeas
corpus in McCleskey v. Zant." In McCleskey, the Court relaxed the
standard for determining that a habeas petitioner has "abused the writ"
with the filing of a second or subsequent habeas petition.' 2' Specifically,
the Court held that in situations involving successive habeas corpus peti-
tions, the habeas court should apply the same standard used to determine
whether to excuse a petitioner's state procedural defaults in order to de-
termine whether to hear the successive petition."13 The Court stated that
this "cause and prejudice standard should curtail abusive petitions that
in recent years have threatened to undermine the integrity of the habeas
corpus process.""" In McCleskey, the Court enforced a hard rule
designed to protect state interests and continued to restrict the congres-
sional jurisdiction intended to preserve individual constitutional rights." 5
117. Coleman, 111 S. Ct. at 2565.
118. Id.
119. See id. at 2566-68.
120. See generally Comment, Adequate and Independent State Grounds Doctrine: Cole-
man v. Thompson, 105 HARV. L. REV. 329 (1991).
121. 111 S. Ct. 1454 (1991).
122. Id. The "abuse of the writ" standard can be found at 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (1988)
which states:
[A] subsequent application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of such person need
not be entertained by a court of the United States or a justice or judge of the United
States unless the application alleges and is predicated on a factual or other ground
not adjudicated on the hearing of the earlier application for the writ, and unless the
court, justice, or judge is satisfied that the applicant has not on the earlier application
deliberately withheld the newly asserted ground or otherwise abused the writ.
Id.
123. McClesky, 111 S. Ct. at 1467-71. The Court adopted the standard of "cause and
prejudice" which required the petitioner to show that he or she was prevented from present-
ing the claim by some outside cause and that actual prejudice arose from the error. Id.
124. McClesky, 111 S. Ct. at 1471.
125. See generally The Supreme Court, 1990 Term - Leading Cases 105 HARV. L. REv.
319 (1991). Commentators have suggested that the McCleskey decision will cause more pris-
oners to be held or executed without a meritorious claim being heard, depriving them of
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IV. SEVENTH CIRCUIT ANALYSIS IN Brecht
The Brecht court referred to themes of federalism and finality as being
at the forefront of any discussion on the scope of collateral review. 126 It
then concentrated on three additional practical considerations in deter-
mining whether a federal court should examine a state's decision. The
first consideration is that substantial delay will occur when collateral re-
view is followed by a new trial."27 Second, because of the high costs of
retrial, federal courts may dilute the standard of harmlessness, excusing
errors that would not have been tolerated on direct appeal. 128 Finally, the
Brecht court maintained that while re-doing decisions made by state
courts, time would be taken from federal matters. The federal courts
would have even less time to devote to cases that have not even received
initial consideration.
1 2
9
The court in Brecht then stated that to select a standard for assessing
harmless error, an assessment of the marginal benefits and costs of en-
forcement is required. 3 0 The standards from Kotteakos v. United
States' and United States v. Lane' 2 were compared with the Chapman
standard of review on collateral attack. 3' The court stated that the dif-
ference between the two would not be likely to impair the enforcement of
Doyle."3 It added that "[w]hen the rule is as far removed from protecting
their liberty or life. See id. at 329 ("[T]he Court's ruling strikes a deadly blow."); David D.
Kammer, Restricting New-Claim Successive Applications for Federal Writs of Habeas
Corpus: McCleskey v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. 1454 (1991), 60 U. CIN. L. REv. 1405 (1992).
126. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 944 F.2d 1363, 1372 (7th Cir. 1991), aff'd, 113 S. Ct. 1710
(1993). For a full discussion on federalism and finality, see generally Coleman v. Thompson,
111 S. Ct. 2546, 2565 (1991); McCleskey, 111 S. Ct. at 1456.
127. Brecht, 944 F.2d at 1373. "Passage of time diminishes the courts' ability to resolve
factual disagreements accurately. Trials long after the event, when memories have faded, are
less likely to convict the guilty and acquit the innocent." Id. Furthermore, new trials mean
there is an opportunity for new errors. Id.
128. Id. The court further argued that state courts would then relax their own vigilance,
which could be avoided if the standards of harmlessness on direct and collateral review were
distinguished. Id.
129. Id. Less time per case means a greater chance an error will occur. It also means that
a longer docket will form, during which disputes fester and memories fade, impairing the
federal courts' ability to accurately resolve their pending cases. Id.
130. Id. at 1374.
131. 328 U.S. 750 (1946).
132. 474 U.S. 438 (1986).
133. See supra notes 20-26 and accompanying text. Kotteakos and Lane held that only
an error that exerts substantial influence on the course of the trial and produces actual
prejudice to the accused vitiates the judgment. Lane, 474 U.S. at 449; Kotteakos, 328 U.S.
at 776.
134. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 944 F.2d 1363, 1374 (7th Cir. 1991), aff'd, 113 S. Ct. 1710
(1993).
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the innocent as is Doyle, there is no need for the strict enforcement that
the Chapman standard creates. '135
In its conclusion, the Brecht court proffered a new standard of harm-
lessness on collateral enforcement of prophylactic rules such as Doyle. It
held that the correct standard should be whether the error "had substan-
tial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict."136
In its application, the court held that the four references to Brecht's post-
arraignment silence did not have "substantial and injurious effect," given
the many proper references to his silence preceding arraignment.
137
Therefore, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the Doyle violation did not
support a writ of habeas corpus and reversed the district court.3 s
In reversing the district court, the Brecht court recognized that in 1990,
the Eighth Circuit elected not to apply the Kotteakos-Lane approach to
collateral review of Doyle errors. 139 However, the Seventh Circuit respect-
fully declined to follow the Eighth Circuit."" One commentator stated
that the Seventh Circuit returned to the vexing issue of determining the
appropriate standard of harmless error analysis on collateral review of
state court judgments."1 He further criticized the Seventh Circuit for
"[b]ucking its own precedents, the law in many other circuits, and argua-
bly the Supreme Court as well. . . ."I"' The practical effect is that more
errors will be deemed harmless and that habeas relief will be less availa-
ble to remedy admitted errors below.14 3
Brecht also recognized that the Supreme Court used the Chapman
standard on collateral attack twice previously."4 In the first case, Rose v.
Clark,1 5 the central question was whether an unconstitutional burden-
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1375. See Lane, 474 U.S. at 449; Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 776.
137. Brecht, 944 F.2d at 1376.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1375 (citing Bass v. Nix, 909 F.2d 297, 304-05 & n.14 (8th Cir. 1990)).
140. Id. at 1375-76. The court stated that the Bass court misunderstood the justification
of the Doyle rule and the Supreme Court's present view on post-arraignment silence. Id. at
1376.
141. Adam H. Kurland, Foreward: The Seventh Circuit as a Criminal Court: The Role of
a Federal Appellate Court in the Nineties, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1, 26, n.110 (1991).
142. Id.
143. Id. "Brecht seems grounded in a naked reevaluation of existing precedent. This
shunting aside of controlling precedent by an intermediate appellate court was not accepted
quietly." Id. Note that five Seventh Circuit judges voted in favor of a rehearing en banc, but
fell one vote short. Brecht, 944 F.2d at 1376 n.*. Judge Cudahy, the third panel member,
concurred in the judgment but also voted to rehear the case en banc. Id. at 1376 & n.*. He
indicated in his concurrence that he believed the majority improperly overruled the existing
Supreme Court "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" standard required by Chapman v.
California. Id. at 1376.
144. Brecht, 944 F.2d at 1375.
145. 478 U.S. 570 (1986).
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shifting instruction could ever be harmless error. 4 ' The Court held that
such instruction may be deemed harmless under Chapman.147 In the sec-
ond case,"4 8 the Court held that the Supreme Court'of South Carolina
erred in withholding collateral relief when it employed a standard of
harmlessness which varied from that established by Chapman. 49 Brecht
maintained that Yates was different because it dealt with constitutional
rules designed to protect the innocent, whereas Doyle represented a pe-
numbra rule.150 Also, Yates was directed at a "state court apparently un-
willing to accept the federal norm; Wisconsin, by contrast, had applied
Doyle conscientiously." 15
The Brecht court circumvented the Supreme Court's application of
Chapman in Rose and Yates by recognizing that "only twice" had the
Supreme Court applied Chapman. In addition, the Brecht court stated
that neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has directed the application
of the Chapman standard on collateral review. 52 The court illustrated
the proposition that the standard of harmless error may vary between
direct and collateral appeal by describing the enforceability of Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 11.153 On direct appeal it is enforceable by
virtually automatic reversal, but on collateral attack it is only enforceable
to the extent that disregarding its provisions would make the proceedings
fundamentally unfair.' The court then concluded that "one round of re-
view is sufficient unless something has gone very wrong indeed. Collateral
review is not supposed to be a replay of the direct appeal.' 55
146. Brecht, 944 F.2d at 1375.
147. Rose, 478 U.S. at 582.
148. Yates v. Evatt, 111 S. Ct. 1884 (1991). In Yates, a South Carolina trial court issued
jury instructions in a murder case stating that malice could be presumed from the use of a
deadly weapon and that malice could be presumed when death occurs in the course of an
unlawful act. Brecht, 944 F.2d at 1375. Both presumptions allowed the state to evade its
burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and thus, were declared unconstitutional.
Id. See Yates v. Aiken, 484 U.S. 211 (1988); Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979).
The state court originally denied relief to Yates without even citing to federal cases, despite
a remand by the Supreme Court with instructions to apply Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307
(1985). On remand from Yates v. Aiken, the state court misstated the facts, showing com-
plete disdain for the opinion reversing it. The Supreme Court again granted review and
reversed, explaining the meaning of Chapman in burden-shifting cases. Brecht, 944 F.2d at
1375.
149. Brecht, 944 F.2d at 1375 (citing Yates v. Evatt, 111 S. Ct. 1884, 1892 & n.8 (1991)).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 1374.
153. Id. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 establishes procedures for taking guilty
pleas.
154. Id. (citing United States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780 (1979)); McCarthy v. United
States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969).
155. Id. (citations omitted).
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Once the Brecht court determined that the Kotteakos-Lane standard
was to be applied, it found that the application to the present case was
straightforward.16  Brecht could not "with a straight face," contend that
the four references to his post-arrest silence had "substantial and injuri-
ous effect" because there were many other proper references to his pre-
arrest silence. 157 Finally, since the court rejected the "overwhelming evi-
dence" test from Harrington v. California,' it found that the violation
of Doyle did not support a writ of habeas corpus.'
V. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION
In a five-four decision, the Supreme Court upheld the Seventh Circuit's
new harmless error standard for collateral review of constitutional er-
rors. '6 Writing for the majority,' 6 Chief Justice Rehnquist began by rec-
ognizing that Brecht had suffered a Doyle error. He classified the Doyle
error as a trial error, not as a prophylactic rule, and then proceeded to
discuss collateral review and why the Chapman standard did not apply
on collateral review.
In characterizing the error that Brecht suffered, the Court referred to
its decision in Doyle v. Ohio. 6' In line with the five lower courts that
heard the Brecht case, the Supreme Court found it obvious that the pros-
ecution's reference to Brecht's post-arrest silence violated Doyle and
thus, Due Process.1 63 The Court disagreed with the Seventh Circuit, how-
ever, in the characterization of a Doyle violation. The Seventh Circuit
referred to Doyle as a "prophylactic rule designed to protect another pro-
phylactic rule [Miranda] from erosion or misuse."'6 4 The Supreme Court
disagreed stating that Doyle is "rooted in fundamental fairness and due
156. Id. at 1376.
157. Id.
158. See supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text.
159. Brecht 944 F.2d at 1376. Judge Cudahy concurred in the judgment, but only because
he believed that the error was not "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. Standing on
precedent, he stated, "I do not believe - whatever its merits - that this is an open ques-
tion." Id. at 1377.
160. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710 (1993).
161. Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Ste-
vens, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas joined. Justice Stevens filed a concurring opinion. Jus-
tice White filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Blackmun joined and in which Justice
Souter joined except for the footnote and Part III. Justices Blackmun, O'Connor, and Sou-
ter filed dissenting opinions.
162. 426 U.S. 610 (1976). See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
163. Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1717. In Doyle, the Court held that "the use for impeachment
purposes of [a defendant's] silence, at the time of arrest and after receiving Miranda warn-
ings, violate[s] the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Doyle, 426 U.S. at
619.
164. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 944 F.2d 1363, 1370 (7th Cir. 1991), afl'd, 113 S. Ct. 1710
(1993).
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process concerns" and "does not bear the hallmarks of a prophylactic
rule."'16 5 Instead, the Supreme Court classified a Doyle error as a "trial
error," a term first explained in Arizona v. Fulminante.166 Trial errors are
those which occur during the presentation of a case to the jury, and since
Chapman, have been subjected to the harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-
doubt standard.167
The Court then explained the Chapman standard,16 8 specifically recog-
nizing that it was established on direct review.6 8 Although acknowledging
that the Chapman standard has been applied in several federal habeas
cases, the Court added that it has not yet squarely addressed Chapman's
applicability on collateral review.17 0 Therefore, the Court stated that it
was not bound by stare decisis and was free to address the issue on its
merits.' 7 ' .
The Court first looked to the federal habeas corpus statute for guid-
ance, but found that it is silent as to collateral review.7 2 The habeas
corpus statute merely permits federal courts to entertain a habeas peti-
tion and directs the courts to "dispose of the matter as law and justice
require.' 17 3 Since the statute says nothing about the standard for harm-
less error review in habeas cases, the Court felt free to consider respon-
dent's suggestion to adopt the Kotteakos standard. 17 4 The Court briefly
discussed petitioner's argument, contending that since Congress was una-
ble to enact legislation after Chapman to limit the availability of habeas
relief, it must have intended that a less strict standard of harmless error
analysis on collateral review was inappropriate. 7 5 However, stating that
the Court is reluctant to draw inferences from the inaction of Congress, it
quickly dismissed the proposition. 17 6
With the Court's determination that it had the duty to establish the
correct standard of harmless error on collateral review absent direct stat-
utory guidance, it first considered its habeas jurisprudence. 7 7 The Court
distinguished direct review from collateral review by pointing to examples
165. Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1717.
166. 111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991). See supra notes 57-65 and accompanying text.
167. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
168. See supra notes 25-30 and accompanying text.
169. Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1718.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1992).
173. 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (1992).
174. Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1718-19. See Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776
(1946), which determined that an error requires reversal only if it had "substantial or injuri-
ous effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict." Id.
175. Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1718-19.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 1719.
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of its cases; some describe collateral review 7 s and others illustrate the
application of different standards on collateral review.179 The two most
frequently cited reasons for distinguishing between direct and collateral
review are federalism and the state's interest in finalizing convictions. 8 0
"Federal intrusions into state criminal trials frustrate both the State's
sovereign power to punish offenders and their good-faith attempts to
honor constitutional rights."''
In its decision to apply a different standard of harmlessness in a habeas
proceeding, the Court considered the arguments supra and finally stated
that "state courts are fully qualified to identify constitutional error and
evaluate its prejudicial effect on the trial process under Chapman and
State courts often occupy a superior vantage point from which to evaluate
the effect of trial error."'8 2 The Court dismissed Brecht's argument that
the Chapman standard is necessary to deter state courts from giving re-
laxed harmless error review and to discourage prosecutors from commit-
ting the error.8 3 No reason was found to believe that lower federal or
state courts would violate their Article VI duty to uphold the Constitu-
tion. In addition to interests of federalism and finality, the Court men-
tioned the significant "social costs" that would be imposed by retrying
178. See, e.g., Kuhlman v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 447 (1986) ("The Court uniformly has
been guided by the proposition that the writ should be available to afford relief to those
'persons whom society has grievously wronged' in light of modern concepts of justice.")
(quoting Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 440-41 (1963)); Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887
(1983) ("The role of federal habeas proceedings, while important in assuring that constitu-
tional rights are observed, is secondary and limited."); United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152,
165 (1982) ("[Ain error that may justify reversal on direct appeal will not necessarily sup-
port a collateral attack on a final judgment.") (quoting United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S.
178, 184 (1979)).
179. See, e.g., Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 320-28 (1987) (holding that new rules
seldom have retroactive application to criminal cases on federal habeas review); Frady, 456
U.S. at 162-69 (holding that the "plain error" rule applies to claims on direct appeal, but the
"cause and prejudice" standard applies in determining whether that same claim may be
raised on habeas); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 489-96 (1976) (holding that claims under
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) are not cognizable on habeas review as long as the state
courts have provided a full and fair opportunity to litigate them at trial or on direct review).
180. Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1720. For a discussion of these issues see McCleskey v. Zant,
111 S. Ct. 1454, 1468-70 (1991); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 110-15 (1977).
181. Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1720 (quoting Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128 (1982)).
182. Id. at 1721 (citing Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 120 (1983) (per curiam)).
183. Id. For a discussion of the negative message sent to prosecutors, see Bennett L.
Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. Prrr. L. REV. 393, 421 (1992) ("tacitly inform[ing]
prosecutors that they can weigh the commission of evidentiary or procedural violations not
against a legal or ethical standard of appropriate conduct, but rather, against an increas-
ingly accurate prediction that the appellate courts will ignore the misconduct when suffi-
cient evidence exists to prove the defendant's guilt."); Goldberg, supra note 13, at 439
("Every time an error is declared harmless in a particular situation, it diminishes the risk to
the prosecutor in the use of the evidence or the technique.").
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defendants whose convictions were set aside.' Additional time and re-
sources would be expended, memories would fade, and witnesses could be
difficult to locate, thus frustrating society's interest in the prompt admin-
istration of justice."8 5 The Court contends that applying the Kotteakos
standard on habeas review of constitutional error would be less onerous
and more likely to promote the considerations that underlie its recent
habeas cases.88 Under the Kotteakos standard, "habeas petitioners may
obtain plenary review of their constitutional claims, but they are not enti-
tled to habeas relief based on trial error unless they can establish that it
resulted in 'actual prejudice.' ,,1s1 However, the Court added a footnote to
its holding that the Kotteakos standard applied. The footnote states:
Our holding does not foreclose the possibility that in an unusual case, a
deliberate and especially egregious error of the trial type, or one that is
combined with a pattern of prosecutorial misconduct, might so infect the
integrity of the proceeding as to warrant the grant of habeas relief, even if it
did not substantially influence the jury's verdict.1 88
The Court then applied the new habeas standard to Brecht's case and
found that the State's references to his post-arrest silence were infre-
quent. 1 Further, the State had made extensive, permissible references to
Brecht's pre-arrest silence. Finally, the State had substantial evidence of
Brecht's guilt.190 Therefore, the Court denied Brecht's petition for habeas
corpus.
In his concurrence, Justice Stevens agreed with the majority that the
Kotteakos standard should be applied on collateral review, but empha-
sized that it is a demanding standard.' 9 ' Specifically, it requires a de novo
examination of the trial record where the reviewing court must decide
that "the error did not influence the jury" and that "the judgment was
not substantially swayed by the error."'" 2 Kotteakos, asserted Stevens, re-
184. Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1721.
185. Id. (citing United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 72 (1986)).
186. Id.
187. Id. (citing United States v. Lane, 474 U.S.. 438, 449 (1986)).
188. Id. at 1722 n.9.
189. Id. The state court had determined that less than two pages of the 900-page trial
transcript contained improper references to Brecht's post-arrest silence. State v. Brecht, 421
N.W.2d 96, 104 (Wis. 1988).
190. The path of the bullet in Hartman's body was inconsistent with the testimony that
the gun discharged as Brecht was falling; nothing was found that could have caused Brecht
to trip; the gun was found outside with a jammed cartridge, appearing as if a second round
was attempted to be fired; and, Brecht had motive to kill Hartman. Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at
1722.
191. Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1723 (Stevens, J., concurring).
192. Id. at 1724 (citing Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764-65 (1946)).
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quires more than simply focusing on how the error may or may not have
affected the jury's verdict. 193
VI. A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE Brecht DECISION
Justice White and Justice O'Connor wrote separate dissents9 support-
ing each other on some points and providing additional viewpoints on
other issues. Both dissenting opinions criticized the majority for ex-
panding the harmless error standard of Chapman beyond a Doyle error
to all trial errors. O'Connor asserted that when constitutional error is
found, proof of harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt provides confi-
dence that the verdict is reliable.9 5 "Such proof demonstrates that, even
though the error had the potential to induce the jury to err, in fact there
is no reasonable possibility that it did."'9 6 White posited further that af-
ter Fulminante, all "trial errors" are subject to harmless error analysis
and most errors are trial errors according to Fulminante.197 Therefore,
"the Court effectively has ousted Chapman from habeas review of state
convictions."' 98
O'Connor and White also agree that, without strong justification,
habeas jurisprudence should not be turned into a "confused patchwork in
which different constitutional rights are treated according to their status,
and in which the same constitutional right is treated differently depend-
ing on whether its vindication is sought on direct or collateral review. ' 9
Judicial efficiency favors simplification. 00 The dissenters also argue that
Kotteakos will not ease the burden on courts. They must still review the
entire record de novo and show sufficient confidence that the verdict
would remain unchanged even if the error had not occurred. "The only
thing the Court alters today is the degree of confidence that suffices."' 0'°
Kotteakos is more lenient, but still requires judicial judgment. Leniency
does not decrease the burden of identifying those cases that warrant re-
lief; it merely reduces the number of cases in which relief will be
granted. 202
193. Id.
194. Justices Blackmun and Souter joined Justice White in his dissent, although Justice
Souter did not join in the footnote or Part III.
195. Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1730 (O'Connor, J. dissenting).
196. Id.
197. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991). See supra notes 57-65 and accompanying text.
198. Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1727 (White, J., dissenting).
199. Id. at 1728 (White, J., dissenting).
200. Id. at 1731 (O'Connor, J. dissenting).
201. Id.
202. Id.
[Vol. 27:549
BRECHT V. ABRAHAMSON
Justice White further argued that the majority's decision created illogi-
cal disparate treatment of constitutional error cases.10 3 White opined that
if a state court erroneously held that there was no constitutional viola-
tion, or that such error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and sub-
sequent writ of certiorari was not sought or granted, relief would be fore-
closed on federal habeas review because of the new more lenient standard
the Court approved. 20 4
Finally, Justice White argued that the majority's result in Brecht is at
odds with one of the functions of habeas review - to deter prosecutors
and courts from disregarding their constitutional responsibilities.
20 5
White disagreed with the majority's assumption that prosecutors and
courts will perform their duties correctly. However, this proposition has
had considerable support with many commentators over the past
decade.2 06
Justice O'Connor also provided a thorough dissent. She stated that re-
straint should be the controlling factor when the Court makes decisions
regarding the writ of habeas corpus. 20 7 Further, Justice O'Connor is not
convinced that federalism, finality, and fairness counsel against applying
Chapman, therefore she would continue to apply its holding on direct
and collateral review. 20 Finally, O'Connor argues that footnote nine of
the majority's opinion will cause prisoners to plead their case in accor-
dance with the narrow exception. 20 9 Moreover, since the Court only says
there is a possible exception, litigators must first address whether the ex-
ception exists at all.
In addition to the arguments advanced by the dissenters in Brecht,
there are several others to be asserted. There is no logical reason for
adopting a new rule that is different from the Chapman standard. The
Supreme Court made it clear that the protection of rights such as those
articulated in Doyle, was contemplated in its Chapman decision. In dis-
cussing the scope of the new rule, the Court stated:
An error in admitting plainly relevant evidence which possibly influenced
the jury adversely to a litigant cannot, under Fahy, be conceived of as
harmless. Certainly error, constitutional error, in illegally admitting highly
203. Id. at 1725 (White, J. dissenting).
204. Id.
205. Id. at 1727.
206. See generally Gershman, supra note 183, at 420-21 (arguing that prosecutors have
been informed by the Court that their violations of a defendant's constitutional rights may
be ignored if sufficient evidence exists to prove the defendant's guilt); Goldberg, supra note
13, at 439 ("Every time an error is declared harmless in a particular situation, it diminishes
the risk to the prosecutor in the use of the evidence or the technique.").
207. Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1728 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
208. Id. at 1729.
209. See supra text accompanying note 187.
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prejudicial evidence or comments, casts on someone other than the person
prejudiced by it the burden to show that it was harmless. 10
More importantly, the applicability of the Chapman standard was never
made contingent on the method of federal review. While Chapman itself
was heard before the Supreme Court on direct appeal, the decision did
not circumscribe its applicability to collateral enforcement of federal
rights. To date, the Court has never drawn such a distinction although it
has had the opportunity in the context of a Doyle violation. When the
issue was most recently raised in Greer v. Miller,'211 the Court, in fact,
deferred decision on the question stating that "we have no occasion to
consider whether Doyle errors may be viewed differently on collateral at-
tack on direct review."
212
The Supreme Court recently applied the Chapman standard in collat-
eral habeas corpus proceedings. In both Rose v. Clark,1 3 and Yates v.
Evatt,"14 the Court held that challenged jury instructions would be re-
viewed under the "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" standard. In
both cases, the alleged constitutional violations related to the use of jury
instructions which allowed the prosecutor to evade the requirement of
proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The decisions in
Rose and Yates suggest that the Court remains committed to the applica-
tion of the Chapman standard in the collateral enforcement of federal
rights. Therefore, the Chapman standard should have been used to ad-
dress the constitutional error in Brecht's case. Notwithstanding the cur-
rent applicability of the Chapman standard, the Supreme Court held that
is was not bound by stare decisis because it had not ruled directly on the
issue." 5 By detracting from its previous decisions which applied Chap-
man, the Court's motivation becomes clear. The Court had the opportu-
nity to embrace Chapman on collateral review, but the Court ignored it,
holding to its agenda to "fix" habeas corpus.
The Court has not considered the natural consequences of upholding
the Seventh Circuit in Brecht. Watering-down the harmless error stan-
dard on -collateral review will still contribute to judicial waste. Although
the number of habeas cases will decrease, countless appeals occurring
prior to a petition for a writ of habeas corpus will remain. This will not
promote judicial efficiency, it will only create more waste. All lower courts
will continue to hear cases that will only be disposed of ultimately upon
collateral review which uses a new standard. Conversely, the courts will
still be backlogged on collateral review because although the standard of
210. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23-24 (1967).
211. 483 U.S. 756 (1987).
212. Id. at 756.
213. 478 U.S. 570 (1986).
214. 111 S. Ct. 1884 (1991).
215. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1718 (1993).
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review is weaker, the courts are still required to review the entire record
de novo. If it is the Court's intention to alleviate the problems of habeas
corpus and control the amount of litigation, upholding Brecht v. Abra-
hamson will not accomplish that end.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Brecht v. Abrahamson came as no
surprise to most commentators and practitioners in American criminal
constitutional law. The current trend, since at least the advent of the
Rehnquist Court, has been to dilute the harmless error standard as a
means to eviscerate habeas corpus. Massive opposition to this course by
attorneys as well as academicians has done little to curtail the string of
opinions emanating from the Court which have all but succeeded in re-
moving the writ of habeas corpus as a substantive protection of federal
constitutional rights. What Brecht has done, however, is to highlight the
underlying fallacy of the Court's approach to what it considers the "prob-
lem" of habeas corpus.
No one can seriously dispute that prisoners' rights litigation, especially
habeas corpus, is an enormous strain on the federal judicial system. The
great majority of habeas petitions filed are unfounded, last-ditch efforts
by properly convicted criminals seeking to escape the retributive effects
of their conduct. It is in the federal district courts of this country, which
are laboring under the influx of these filings to the disadvantage of the
rest of their dockets, where habeas corpus remains a problem to be
solved.
By eliminating the Chapman standard for harmless error in collateral
federal proceedings, the Court in Brecht does nothing to resolve the diffi-
culties and challenges posed by the doctrine of habeas corpus. After
Brecht, no fewer petitions for relief will be filed in the district courts, no
less effort will be required of federal judges in reaching the merits of
those petitions and, no more efficient procedure for disposing of collateral
attacks will be established. In short, the "problem" of habeas continues
unabated.
Rather than addressing these concerns, Brecht has an effect far more
ill-advised and damaging to our criminal justice system. By adulterating
the harmless error standard in order to lessen the effect of habeas corpus,
the Court in Brecht succeeds only in eviscerating the underlying federal
rights that are the subject of habeas claims. While most habeas petitions
do not involve challenges of significant constitutional dimensions, there
are important exceptions. In every haystack there is a needle. These ex-
ceptions are the cases that federal habeas law was designed to remedy.
By raising the threshold standard for demonstrating harmful error, the
Court has only determined that some constitutional rights are not impor-
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tant enough to uphold. This decision is superficially based on the Court's
expressed intent to respect state courts' own determinations of federal
constitutional challenges. Such a concern is illusory and dangerous. No
person or entity benefits from a purposeful reduction in the force behind
individual constitutional rights. In fact, a continued assault on constitu-
tional rights masquerading as an attack on habeas corpus will result only
in a generalized lack of respect for a legal system which has only contin-
ued to function thus far through persistent and vigilant protection of
these rights. Brecht threatens us today with this very loss of respect. Al-
most as bad, Brecht does not even do what it portends to do; address the
"problem" of habeas corpus.
Lisa S. Spickler
